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Costs of Unsuccessful Criminal Defense Are Deductible 
"Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expenses-
Tellier v. Commissioner* 
Taxpayer, a broker and underwriter, was convicted for violations 
of the Securities Act of 19331 and the federal mail fraud statute,2 and 
• 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3102 (U.S. Oct. 12, 
1965) (No. 351) (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964). 
2. 18 u.s.c. § 1341 (1964). 
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for conspiracy to violate those statutes.8 He claimed a deduction for 
the legal expenses incurred in his defense. The Commissioner's dis-
allowance of the deduction was sustained by the Tax Court.4 On 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sitting en 
bane, held, reversed.5 Legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful 
defense against criminal charges arising out of a trade or occupation 
are deductible "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. 
In section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress 
has provided for the deduction from gross income of "ordinary and 
necessary" business expenses.6 The courts have superimposed upon 
this provision a limitation requiring disallowance of a deduction for 
expenses incurred in derogation of public policy. 7 Relying upon thfse 
two criteria, courts have consistently disallowed deductions for legal 
expenses incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense. 8 In the princi-
pal' case, the Second ·circuit determined for the first time that the 
denial of these deductions is required neither by the "ordinary and 
necessary" test of section 162 nor by public policy.0 • 
3. 18 U.S.C. § JJ7I (1964). The taxpayer was convicted on a thirty-six count indict• 
ment alleging that he had defrauded some twelve hundred purchasers of debentures 
issued by Alaska Telephone Corporation. See United States v. Tellier, 19 F,R,D. 164 
(E.D.N.Y. 1956). 
4. Walter F. Tellier, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 212 (1963). 
5. As the question presented by the appeal had previously been considered settled 
by Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931), it was 
felt that the entire circuit bench should vote on the decision to overrule the prior 
categorical holding. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 692 n.3 (2d Cir, 1965). Chief 
Judge Lumbard, joined by Judges Waterman and Kaufman, wrote a concurring 
opinion emphasizing that recent decisions giving broad scope to the sixth amendment 
right to counsel indicate a public policy in favor of allowing a deduction for the 
expenses incurred by a business in defending against criminal charges, without regard 
to the ultimate outcome. 
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). 
7. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Tank Truck Rentals, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-lS(d) (1960). 
8. The rule disallowing the legal expenses of an unsuccessful criminal defendant 
was first suggested in Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924). For subsequent cases, see 
Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41 TAXES 711 (1963); Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 
1409 (1961). Although the rule has been consistently stated, the results of the cases have 
been confused and conflicting when courts have been forced to deal with legal expenses 
incurred in government action not clearly "criminal," or in criminal litigation in which 
the final determination was not entirely adverse to the taxpayer. Thus, the Tax Court 
has disallowed the attorneys' fees incurred in unsuccessfully resisting an action to 
revoke a· professional license when revocation resulted from a criminal conviction, 
Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956). The deductibility of the legal expense of unsuc• 
cessfully resisting an antitrust attack has arbitrarily hinged on whether the action was 
civil or criminal. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 52. Likewise, although the legal 
expense of defending against civil liability for taxes was deductible even when a 
penalty for fraud was assessed, Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959), 
the expenses incurred in defending a tax-evasion indictment were not deductible where 
the defendant pleaded nolo contendere, despite a later finding by the Tax Court that 
there had been no fraudulent evasion during the years in question. Bell v. Commis• 
sioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963). This situation has long been criticized by the 
commentators. See the works cited in the principal case, 342 F.2d at 694 n,13. 
9. Principal case at 695. 
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In rejecting an unbroken line of authority, the court has cor-
rected a long-standing legal anomaly. Consistent application of sec-
tion 162 demands that legal expenses be held both "ordinary" and 
"necessary" whether incurred in civil or criminal litigation and re-
gardless of the final determination. In non-criminal contexts, the 
Supreme Court has held that an expenditure is "ordinary" if it is 
customary.10 It is clearly customary for a person engaged in a trade or 
business to incur legal expenses in connection with any criminal 
prosecution arising from that trade or business, irrespective of the 
outcome of the litigation. The Supreme Court has also held in non-
criminal contexts that an expense to be "necessary" need only be 
helpful to, or proximately resulting from, the taxpayer's business.11 
Certainly, this broad characterization includes expenses incurred 
even in unsuccessfully defending business activities.12 Nevertheless, 
prior to the principal case courts had consistently refused to apply 
these standards to the legal expenses of an unsuccessful criminal de-
fendant, holding that it was neither "ordinary" nor "necessary" for 
the guilty to incur expenses in their defense.13 Such a position un-
reasonably assumes that defendants, unlike 3udges, can predict the 
results of criminal cases.14 
Having found the legal expenses of the unsuccessful criminal 
defendant to be "ordinary and necessary," the Tellier court also re-
jected the government's contention that to allow a deduction for such 
expenses would be contrary to public policy.15 The continual accept-
ance of this contention by courts prior to Tellier is difficult to justify; 
indeed, two different but related considerations would seem to sup-
port the Tellier court. First, it is not at all clear that any public policy-
considerations require disallowance. Although courts have held that 
allowance of the deduction would subsidize the defense of criminals 
and encourage criminal activity,16 it is also arguable that disallowance 
places an additional premium on successfully resisting prosecution, 
thus tending to protract litigation and inhibit compromises between 
prosecutor and defendant. Moreover, 'disallowance mistakenly as-
sumes that the expenses of presenting a defense are an additional 
10. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940). 
11. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). The definitions of "ordinary" 
and "necessary" set forth in DuPont, supra note 10, and Kornhauser, supra, were 
applied by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), hold-
ing deductible the legal expenses incurred in a civil action in which the taxpayer 
unsuccessfully resisted a fraud order of the Postmaster General. The Court expressly 
declined to comment on the situation in which legal expenses are incurred in an 
unsuccessful criminal defense. 
12. Cf. Commissioner v. Heininger, supra note 11. 
13. See, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963). 
14. See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 135 (1962). 
15. Principal case at 693-94. 
16. E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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criminal sanction.17 Disallowance is also inconsistent with the well-
established deduction allowed the taxpayer against whom the govern-
ment has successfully enforced civil penalties for unlawful business 
behavior.18 Second, even if it is conceded arguendo that public policy 
might be frustrated by allowing the deduction, courts require that, in 
order to be the basis for disallowance, the policy must be sharply de-
fined by governmental declaration.19 This requirement is not met in 
the principal case. There exists no statute or regulation which dis-
courages a defendant from incurring expenses in attempting to show 
that his behavior was not criminal. In fact, recent congressional 
action recognizes a policy in favor of paid legal counsel for all crimi-
nal defendants.20 Indeed, as Chief Judge Lumbard pointed out in his 
concurring opinion in the principal case, 21 the constitutional guaran-
tees of the right to counsel, which are in no way contingent upon the 
presentation of a successful defense, would seem almost totally to 
preclude the definition of a public policy against the exercise of that 
right.22 
The decision in the principal case should not be interpreted 
as calling for an end to judicial disallowance of deductions on public 
policy grounds. Indeed, it would be a discredit to judicial common 
sense to suggest that Congress should have to codify specifically its 
intention not to encourage policy violations.23 Neither should the 
decision be arbitrarily limited. Implicit in the opinion is a rejection 
of suggestions that the deduction be disallowed if the defense is 
asserted in bad faith or if the crime is malum in se.24 More-
17. See Burroughs Bldg. Material Co., 18 B.T .A. 101, 105 (1929) (dissenting opinion): 
compare Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), disallowing a 
deduction for fines, the criminal sanction prescribed by law. 
18. Cf. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943). 
19. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). In Lilly, the taxpayer, an optician, was 
allowed a deduction for "kickbacks" he had made to physicians recommending his 
services. The practice was widespread and, although condemned by state and national 
medical associations, was not in violation of any state law. The Supreme Court held 
that in order to be the basis of disallowance, "the policies frustrated must be rtational 
or state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them," Id. at 97. 
20. See the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). 
21. 342 F.2d at 695-96 (concurring opinion). See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and 
the Income Tax, 12 TAX L. R.Ev. 241, 267 (1957). Compare Cammarano v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), holding that an expense incurred by a business in exercising 
a constitutional right is not necessarily deductible. 
22. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938). 
23. But see 65 COLUM L. R.Ev. 1111 (1965). 
24. The suggestion in McDonald, Deduction of Attorneys' Fees for Federal Income 
Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 168 (1954), that a deduction should be allowed only 
when the criminal defense is asserted in good faith, has been harshly criticized for the 
administrative difficulties it presents. Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 134 (1962). The Tax 
Court originally indicated that disallowance was required only where the taxpayer was 
convicted of a crime malum in se. Sarah Backer, I B.T.A. 214 (1924). None of the later 
cases draws this distinction. By making no reference to either the nature of the crimes 
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over, the Tellier court's holding that unsuccessful criminal defense 
fees are "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, read in conjunc-
tion with the Supreme Court's allowance of a deduction for the 
operating expenses of an illegal gambling establishment although 
payment of the expenses was an independent criminal offense,25 may 
indicate that even an illegal business should be allowed a deduction 
for attorneys' fees incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense. How-
ever, the public policy limitation on deductibility is of necessity ad-
ministered on a case-by-case basis.26 It cannot be supposed that the 
Commissioner, having so long espoused the rule rejected in Tellier, 
will readily allow the deduction when it is sought by an illegal busi-
ness or a professional criminal. 
for which the taxpayer was convicted or the merits of the defense he presented, the 
court in the principal case implicitly rejected both of these distinctions. 
25. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). 
26. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958). 
